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MULTINATIONAL ELECTION MONITORING:
ADVANCING INTERNATIONAL LAW ON
THE HIGH WIRE
Gregory H. Fox*
The United Nations, born in a spirit of post-war optimism,
quickly fell victim to the paralysis of the Cold War. Conflicts
seemingly appropriate for U.N. mediation were quickly moved
beyond its reach by extensive superpower involvement. In each
such conflict in which East and West asserted an interest - pri-
marily a series of proxy wars conduct barely beneath the surface
of local civil wars - settlement was elevated to an issue of global
importance. As a result, internal conflict ravaged countries such
as Somalia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Zaire, Vietnam,
Cambodia, and El Salvador long past the point at which con-
certed multinational efforts at mediation might have produced
peace.
It is no small irony that while the United Nations was effec-
tively excluded from these conflicts at their early incendiary
stages, it has been called upon in the post-Cold War era to ad-
dress many of their most destructive consequences. The rebuild-
ing of states shattered by war and plagued by stagnant develop-
ment, poor governance, and incessant internal strife has become
the United Nations' most visible and costly task in the 1990's.
With international resources never plentiful and now shrinking,
however, the U.N. is eager to find ways to avoid the prospect of
certain states becoming virtual wards of the international system.
Self-sufficiency for these states has therefore become an impor-
tant U.N. goal.
At the center of multilateral efforts to assist such states in
repairing their social fabrics has been the monitoring of national
elections. The proliferation of election monitoring has pro-
ceeded on the assumption that democratic states will be both
more viable economically and less prone to internal conflict. In
its typically diffuse fashion, the international legal order has in-
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stitutionalized this commitment to democratic governance in an
uneven manner. Nevertheless, the rise of election monitoring
has been paralleled by a steady growth of other incentive systems
designed both to induce states to hold free and fair elections
and to maintain the integrity of democratic regimes once estab-
lished. Often, an entire range of such incentives - including
the withholding of recognition, bilateral and multilateral assist-
ance, and membership in regional organizations - is brought
to bear on a particular state while election monitoring efforts are
underway.
This comprehensive form of social engineering - some-
times referred to as "nation building" - is remarkable in two
respects. First, in marshalling a notion of democratic legitimacy
the U.N. missions have rendered judgment on an issue tradition-
ally at the heart of state sovereignty: how national leaders are
chosen. The notion of popular sovereignty implicit in a moni-
tored vote goes far beyond traditional human rights laws' pro-
nouncement that certain domestic policies are no longer sover-
eign prerogatives. The theory of popular sovereignty speaks to
the more fundamental question of who holds sovereign power
within a state. In many ways, national discretion on this question
embodies the essence of political autonomy. Yet the validity of
electoral choice is increasingly ajudgment entrusted to individu-
als and organizations with no more connection to a state than
their presence during a vote.
Second, and related to the first, is the high-stakes nature of
U.N. electoral missions. Many of these missions have been to
states with little tradition of peacefully transferring power
through elections. Despite the essentially experimental nature
of democratic systems in such societies, U.N. electoral missions
vest the prestige of the international community in their success-
ful outcome. They do so by making two crucial assumptions.
The first is that a democratic political system is appropriate to
the state in question, regardless of its economic circumstances,
prior political experience, or current state of social cohesion.
The second is that the victorious party or candidate is entitled to
international recognition as the state's legitimate government.
Both of these assumptions may be proven wrong (or appear to
be proven wrong) by a variety of events: the results of an ex-
tremely close election may be rejected by claims of fraud; a coup
may topple the elected government; the incumbent government
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may refuse to yield power; the winning party may begin to op-
press its opponents; new guarantees of party pluralism may insti-
tutionalize old ethnic rivalries; and the high expectations of in-
stant social reform that often accompany democratic transitions
may not materialize. The prospect of one or more of these
events occurring after a monitored election is not insubstantial.
Yet it is equally clear that continued support for international
monitoring will depend on their not occurring with any great
frequency. As the Somalia experience demonstrates, only one
perceived failure can lead to widespread cynicism about the via-
bility of "nation building" efforts.
As a legal matter, election monitoring is most fruitfully ana-
lyzed as an issue of human rights. This is by no means the only
possible perspective. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has re-
cently described election monitoring as an aspect of the
peacekeeping process that he terms "post conflict peace build-
ing."' For him, such missions represent efforts to bring societies
torn by war or otherwise rendered chaotic into an orderly exist-
ence regulated by law.
The human rights approach, however, has the advantage of
linking the practice of monitoring with the normative basis for
holding elections in the first place. The norm of political partic-
ipation is found in all comprehensive human rights treaties, as
well as others concerned with the rights of specific groups. The
most widely ratified treaty addressing the subject is the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,2 Article 25 of
which guarantees a right to "genuine periodic elections." As of
July 1994 there were 127 state parties to the Covenant.3 Other
treaties containing such a guarantee include the First Protocol to
the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 3), the
American Convention on Human Rights (Article 23), the Afri-
can Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Article 13), the In-
ternational Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Article 5(c)), and the Convention on the Polit-
ical Rights of Women (Article 1). The non-binding documents
1. Report of the Secretay-General: An Agenda for Peace, U.N. Doc. A/47/277 & S/241 11
(1992).
2. GA Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966).
3. Rort of the Human Rights Committee to the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR 49th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994).
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of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, most
notably the Copenhagen Document, also contain extensive and
innovative provisions on political participation.
Despite this widespread and firm grounding in treaty law,
the international community has only recently become active in
addressing the question of whether elections are the only legiti-
mate means for choosing national leaders and, assuming this is
the case, how elections should be conducted. It is true that prior
to the missions of the post-Cold War era, the United Nations had
a fairly impressive track record in monitoring both referenda
and elections in colonial territories. These began in the late
1950's and continued through the successful Namibia mission of
1990. Yet the institutional framework for monitoring elections
in sovereign states emerged only in April 1992, when the United
Nations established a Unit for Electoral Assistance within the
Secretariat. The Unit has been in such demand that it was re-
cently upgraded to a Division of the Department of Peacekeep-
ing Affairs. In the first year of its operation, the Division re-
ceived thirty-two requests for assistance from Member States. As
of June 1994 the number had increased to fifty-two requests;
twenty-nine of these came from Africa, ten from Eastern Europe,
twelve from Central and South America, and one from Asia.
Prior to the establishment of the office the United Nations had
monitored elections in only two states: Nicaragua and Haiti.
With the expertise of the Electoral Division now in-house,
monitored elections have become virtual fixtures in U.N.-
brokered peace accords to end civil wars. The United Nations'
involvement in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Liberia are
examples of this sort of activity. This increase in activity has sig-
nalled a newfound interest on the part of the United Nations in
questions of domestic governance. Two quotations reflect this
changed perspective. In January 1990, the United Nations was
asked to monitor the first elections of the post-communist era in
Romania. The United Nations declined, with an unnamed U.N.
spokesperson explaining that "the United Nations does not
monitor internal elections in a country."4 By 1993 the U.N. had
been regularly monitoring internal elections for several years. In
the Spring of 1993, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali identified
4. UN. Says it Won't Monitor Romanian Elections, Reuters, Jan. 25, 1990, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
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transitions to democracy as one of three crucial goals of the
United Nations. Explaining the nature of U.N. involvement he
stated rather bluntly, "Democracies almost never fight each
other. Democratization supports the cause of peace. Peace in
turn is a prerequisite to development. So democracy is essential
if development is to be sustained over time. Without develop-
ment there could be no democracy. Societies that lack basic
well-being tend to fall into conflict. So three great priorities are
interlocked."5 In a period of three years, the United Nations
moved from declaring it has no role to play in domestic elections
to elevating electoral assistance to one of its three core goals.
The primary impetus for U.N. action was, of course, the end
of the Cold War. Prior to 1989, advocacy of democracy was a
particular flashpoint for conflict between East and West. One
consequence of this submerging of law into politics was that little
consensus developed on precisely what was meant by "democ-
racy." Yet the effects of the Cold War do not fully explain why
concern for elections and democratic political institutions was,
for many years, missing from the human rights agenda. Failure
to address electoral issues was as characteristic of human rights
NGOs as it was of official U.N. bodies. Progress occurred in
other areas of human rights, beginning primarily in 1966 with
the promulgation of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Why were electoral issues absent? At least three
reasons are evident.
The first is the uniquely intrusive nature of participatory
rights. As noted above, these rights speak to issues profoundly
local in character. How should leaders be chosen? What are the
specific requirements of the process for doing so? Have all inter-
ested elements within a society been included? In addressing
these questions the right to political participation makes a dis-
tinction between those regimes chosen by legitimate processes
and those that are not. Because an electoral process is, by defini-
tion, a means to an end of empowering a representative govern-
ment, a legally flawed process necessarily results in a government
that is itself illegal. For states hesitant to accept human rights
norms in general, this highly intrusive doctrine would certainly
be unacceptable.
5. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later, ORBIs, Summer
1993, at 323.
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The second reason why electoral issues were not more
prominent on the international human rights agenda is that
democratic systems, as we know them today, are relatively recent
phenomena. Universal male suffrage, even in Western states,
did not become widespread until the late nineteenth century.
Full adult suffrage was not common in much of Western Europe
until the mid-twentieth century. In the United States, poll taxes
(a significant barrier to minority participation) were not elimi-
nated by constitutional amendment until 1964. If full par-
ticipatory democracy was not prevalent on the national level un-
til recently, it is somewhat unrealistic to expect that such a sys-
tem would emerge as an international norm.
A final reason for the international community's lack of fo-
cus on participatory rights is that international law has tradition-
ally failed to distinguish between regimes chosen by democratic
procedures and those chosen by other means. The general rule
has been (and likely remains) that any group in effective control
of a state is entitled to recognition as its legitimate government.
There have been some exceptions, such as the policies of Wood-
row Wilson, and others are now beginning to emerge. But the
effective control principle predominates, and it is rather clearly
at odds with the democratic legitimacy principle undergirding a
right to political participation.
Today, each of these three barriers to an effective right is in
retreat. Elected governments are increasingly common among
states in all regions of the world. The strong notions of sover-
eignty that precluded international concern with the quality of
domestic governance have been so eroded by the ubiquity of
human rights norms that the objection carries little more than
rhetorical weight. A legal barrier of sovereignty is further belied
by the ongoing existence of a roster of "pariah" governments -
Libya, Iraq, Myanmar, the Haitian Junta - which are effectively
condemned not for any single policy but for their very existence.
As noted, there has also been change in the norms of recog-
nition, though the degree of movement has been less drastic
than in the other two areas. The case of Haiti is illustrative. Af-
ter President Aristide was ousted by a military coup on Septem-
ber 29, 1991, the U.N. General Assembly and the Organization
of American States ("OAS") quickly condemned the coup as "il-
legal," called on states not to recognize the new government and
refused to seat delegates from the junta as Haiti's representa-
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tives. As a result, for the entire period of President Aristide's
exile the representatives of "Haiti" in the United Nations and
OAS were those appointed by Aristide during his short term in
office.
Two other developments in the field of recognition are
noteworthy. First, a 1992 amendment to the OAS Charter and
the 1991 CSCE Moscow Document provide that if the democrati-
cally-elected government of a member state is overthrown by an
anti-democratic coup, the other member states will refuse to rec-
ognize the usurping government and work to return the legiti-
mate government to power. Second, the Badinter Arbitration
Commission of the International Conference on the Former Yu-
goslavia, empowered by the United Nations and the EC to ad-
dress recognition issues involving the former Yugoslav republics,
held that the existence of democratic institutions was one impor-
tant criterion in the requirements for community recognition.
The democratic legitimacy principle underlying these acts is
increasingly reinforced by a web of institutional norms, each of
which has incorporated notions of legitimacy to a greater or
lesser degree. The Security Council justified armed intervention
in Haiti primarily on the grounds that the military junta refused
to yield power to an elected government. The General Assembly
has also taken up the question of participatory rights, condemn-
ing a number of states for either failing to hold elections or for
overturning the results of "valid" elections. Electoral issues have
begun to appear on the dockets of human rights tribunals,
which are developing an increasingly sophisticated jurispru-
dence on electoral matters. One of the most interesting deci-
sions by the U.N. Human Rights Committee involved a Zambian
citizen who was effectively excluded from the national political
process on the grounds that he belonged to a banned opposi-
tion party. Zambia at the time was a one-party state. The Com-
mittee held that the banning of all but one official political party
violates Article 25 of the Political Covenant.6 It reasoned that a
genuine election cannot take place where the government
monopolizes all political associations. Given that one-party
states were quite common only a few years ago (and continue in
many countries) this holding is remarkable.
6. Bwalya v. Zambia, Commun. No. 314/1988, rerinted in 14 HUM. RTS. LJ. 408
(1993).
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What does this practice suggest for the future of interna-
tional efforts to foster transitions to democratic government?
That democracy is becoming a normative goal of international
law seems fairly clear. But the growth of the institutional web
mentioned above will, I believe, soon come into conflict with
other aspects of the international legal system that present signif-
icant obstacles to the full assimilation of a norm of democratic
government. The continued viability of the norm will depend
on whether a reasonably coherent compromise can be reached
between these conflicting imperatives. Let me identify two po-
tential barriers.
The first stems from the right's necessary focus on regime
legitimacy. As noted, where proper electoral procedures are not
followed - either.through failure to hold an election at all, elec-
toral fraud, by staging a coup, by the refusal to allow victorious
candidates to assume office, or any other means - a strong con-
ception of the right would conclude that the incumbent govern-
ment holds office illegally. The government is, in other words,
illegitimate. What follows from this designation? If a regime is
by law not representative of its people, should its delegates be
seated in the U.N. General Assembly or in any other member-
ship organization? South Africa and Haiti appear to be direct
precedents for a negative answer. Should assistance from inter-
national lending institutions be denied to such regimes? The
European Bank for Reconstruction, established in 1990, pro-
vides in its Charter that it will only lend to pluralist democracies.
Are illegitimate regimes more appropriate candidates for inter-
vention, either unilateral or multilateral? Again Haiti is illustra-
tive. Does the logic of the Security Council's action in that case
create a precedent for collective action against other regimes
whose very existence flouts a democratic norm?
As this rather disconnected list of potential sanctions sug-
gests, the possibilities for enforcement of a norm of democratic
legitimacy are potentially infinite. If a government is defined by
international law as illegal, every point of interaction with that gov-
ernment, either by individual nations or international organiza-
tions, presents a stark choice. If one continues business as usual
with that government then its entitlement to carry on the activity
in question is affirmed. On the other hand, if one treats the
regime as a pariah, in the manner of the white-ruled South Afri-
can government, then the norm's core assumption that the re-
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gime is not entitled to act of behalf of the state is affirmed. If
the latter course is followed, given the number of undemocratic
states in the world, the potential exists to create a rather large
class of legally inferior, pariah states.
The second problem is one raised by the 1991 elections in
Algeria: whether the democratic processes ought to be opened
to parties or individuals who are opposed to the very idea of
political pluralism. In Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Front
("FIS") won a sufficiently large majority in the first round of par-
liamentary elections to ensure that the constitution could be
amended without obstacle. The FIS ran on a platform promis-
ing an Islamic theocracy, which Algerian authorities and other
observers interpreted as meaning an end to political pluralism
and perhaps even elections altogether. Before the second round
of voting could take place, the government canceled the elec-
tions on the justification it was saving the democratic system
from a group that would surely destroy it.
Algeria is only the most dramatic example of a clash be-
tween the right of a political group to organize and run for of-
fice and the right of other citizens, not supporting that party, to
continue to live under a democratic system. Somewhat less dra-
matic examples of the same conflict are presented by the Ger-
man government's attempts to ban far right parties under provi-
sions of the German Constitution. Of course, the central histori-
cal example of this phenomenon is the Nazi party's rise to power
in Weimar Germany through electoral successes.
National practice generally favors exclusions. Many states re-
tain the legal right to ban even small extremist parties on the
theory that despite problems of speculating as to their ultimate
dangerousness, to wait until parties present an actual threat of
assuming power is to court a backlash and perhaps even civil
war. Two prime examples of states with aggressive anti-extremist
laws are Germany and Israel. The United States generally per-
mits all groups open access to the political process. But it is im-
portant not to take too legalistic a perspective when evaluating
this practice. Germany has a history on this subject that looms
large in its collective memory; the United States does not. More-
over, during the 1950's, when many in the United States did per-
ceive a threat to democratic institutions, a broad and debilitating
array of anti-subversive legislation resulted. The core of these
laws was upheld by the Supreme Court. In sum, while the de-
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gree of reactions to extremist parties varies widely, few societies
allow perceived threats to their core political values to go wholly
unchecked.
In political theory and constitutional law circles this is
hardly a new question. For international lawyers, however, it is
virtually a case of first impression raised by the newfound con-
cern for electoral processes. The position of international law
on this issue reflects the treaty drafters' memory of the Weimar
experience. The Political Covenant and the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights both contain provisions allowing for the
exclusion of anti-democratic actors from the political process.
These provisions have been tested and upheld by human rights
tribunals. Yet more so than many other human rights norms,
these provisions rest on an enormously controversial value
choice. Is "democracy" at core a set of procedures that are obliv-
ious to the views advocated by its participants, concerned only
with equal electoral competition among all factions? Or is de-
mocracy a substantive entitlement to enjoy certain fundamental
rights that cannot be abridged even if a majority of citizens votes
in favor of restrictions? For international law to take one per-
spective or the other could, depending on one's view, represent
prudent foresight or a disastrous courting of intolerance. That
is, a norm permitting bans could either make clear to the world's
new democracies the limits of acceptable political discourse or
present a ready-made instrument for oppression to societies that
are primarily in need of more openness.
These two problems will surely persist if the international
community deepens and broadens its concern with democratic
governance. This appears to be the case: the United Nations is
developing an elaborate administrative infrastructure to respond
to the steady increase in requests that it monitor national elec-
tions. Yet the practice of monitoring may itself help to clarify
the law. Multilateral election monitoring is both a creature of
international law and one of its important sources. While the
legal basis for monitoring is grounded in human rights treaties,
much of our understand of participatory norms derives from the
United Nations' thirty-year repertoire of monitoring practice.
Whether this process of normative development continues in the
future will almost certainly depend on the continued success of
these missions.
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